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Documents against ‘Knowledge’; immanence and transcendence and
approaching legal materials
Abstract
In the wake of Ingold’s critique of ‘materiality’, one that highlights the cosmological assumptions about
spirit and matter that the concept inscribes, I examine ‘material’ documents that record custom and
indigenous knowledge on the Rai Coast of Papua New Guinea. Documents and books have a history there
bound up with colonial governance and with missionisation, thus a strong connection with imposed ‘law’
in local understanding, yet the production and circulation of documents have also been a site of
resistance to the imposition of outside forms of politics, law, and ‘knowledge’. Examining the documents
they choose to make themselves makes us consider whether knowledge and law is something that exists
‘to be’ documented, or whether in fact, documentation (like initiation or gardening) may be where
knowledge is ‘immanent’ (following Strathern’s recent formulation). Their documentation is ‘against’
knowledge in the image of a transcendental and universal commons, or a private possession. Focusing
on their modes of making knowledge appear leads to a consideration of the performance of knowledge,
the time and manner of its revelation and concealment, and of how different (cosmological) conceptions
of ‘materials’ and process can be of interest in shaping a ‘legal materialist’ approach without a
transcendent image of law.
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Documents against ‘Knowledge’;
immanence and transcendence and
approaching legal materials*
James Leach
1 Introduction
In Hyo Yoon Kang and Sara Kendall’s exploration of legal materialities
we are invited to see legal materials and the law in a mutually
constituting process. To this effect, Kang writes, ‘law’s materials are
not objects over which law wields its power but its own constitutive
ingredients of revealing itself ’ (463). Yet they also retain a specific
power for ‘law’ as producing a distinct materiality. Law is not simply
there ‘in’ its materials but is somehow constituted out of and transcends
material manifestation as a recognisable force. As Kang continues, ‘[t]
he recognition of legal materiality as a relation between the abstract
and the concrete produces a level of complexity, which cannot be
adequately accounted for by an ethical call to ‘let the material things
speak’ (2018: 465). This emergence is apparent to them in the ‘language
game’ that is central to law, and helps constitute the hierarchical system
of knowledge law relies upon, one that assumes a top down-authority
(backed by the power of the state, monopoly on violence etc.). Thus,
‘[t]he sensibility for law’s internal logic and practice is perhaps the
reason why many of the legal ‘new’ materialists have studied legal media
of inscription, their circulation and interpretation. Texts, in various
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forms and genres, are taken as vital matters through which legality
is materialised through inscription and speech and institute law as a
system of knowledge’ (Hyo Yoon Kang 2018: 459). In this formulation,
there is something that is there to be materialized (‘legality’).
This leads to open questions about what is distinctively legal about
legal materialities. In fact, Kang and Kendall suggest that legal
materiality could even be ‘opposed’ to other forms of materiality.
The proposition contains, then, a fascinating point of animation: the
conjunction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ which is identified as key
to law as a specific realm of practice. They refer to the non-dualism of
Deleuzeian ‘immanence’ to show how law ‘comes into being’ through
its material practice, but retain a social or language/material binary that
denotes a dualist logic which they believe is vital to the subject matter.

I am going to suggest that their image of how law is distinctive
is perfectly accurate (it claims or constitutes itself as a transcendent
force, whether of rationality, or justice, or arbitration), but that it is
problematic to identify the transcendental imposition of form as an
analytic starting point for understanding how particular materials come
to have the effects they do in making ‘the law’ appear. The point for
me is not to trace the adaptation of generic material by a specific social
discourse into legal materialities, but rather to glimpse how this very
image of law’s transcendence is constituted in practice.

In other words, the emphasis on ‘discourse’ runs somewhat counter
to an analysis of legal materials as participating in the construction that
is ‘law’, as it must be somehow prior to, or outside those materials, in
order to be materialised. The location of legal materials within a legal
discourse replicates the idea of a transcendent realm of knowledge
that gets inscribed in materials that then make law ‘appear’. I aim
to pinpoint the particularity of this process as a self-constituting
transcendence, and thus open up a view on other possibilities of dealing
with issues that have the attributes of the legal in the absence of such
self-constituting ideology. I show, by examining a ‘non-transcendent’
image of knowledge that there are ways of ‘doing’ knowledge without
recourse to an image of knowledge as outside or different to the process
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of its appearance. The case is suggestive, by analogy.

The argument refers to things that on the surface appear to be other
than about law. Yet I maintain the focus on ‘knowledge’ (present in
Kang’s formulation of law as a particular institution) is appropriate,
as ‘its’ existence in this discourse (outside its manifest appearance) is
precisely that of ‘law’ itself. By offering an alternative form of ‘doing’
knowledge, drawn from ethnographic material, I offer a clue as to
how we might think about law that does not replicate an ethnocentric
assumption of law/knowledge’s transcendence over materials.
2 Cosmological assumptions: immanence and
transcendence
Tim Ingold (2007) develops a critique of influential anthropological
and archaeological approaches to ‘materiality’. The core of his complaint
is that studies of materiality tend to explicate the centrality of objects and
artefacts through abstract theory rather than attention to the qualities
of their materials and to following the processes of their making. Ingold
instead advances an understanding of materials as offering properties
and possibilities in conjunction with the development of organisms, and
perception itself, in specific processes of what he calls ‘life’. Relations
with others shape and are being shaped in conjunction with materials
as parts of the same process. At heart, Ingold complains that studies
of ‘materiality’ re-inscribe a dualist philosophy of lifeless material and
animating spirit. For my purpose here, I characterise this as a critique
of the cosmological assumptions that a focus on ‘materiality’ imports
into recent anthropological analysis.

As Marc Higgin puts it, there is a ‘problematic animist separation of
lively worlds of human sociality – even enlarged to include all our “stuff”
(Miller 2010) – from a non social, pre-given world of “brute” materials
(Tilley 2007)’ (Higgin 2016: 70). He locates a ‘dialectic’ legacy in
material culture studies, ‘a logic of form that moves seamlessly from
idea-form to object-form to forms of social relation’ (85). An animating
principle of spirit, or agency, or knowledge, is bestowed on, gives form
to, and is somehow subsequently read from material objects. Knowledge
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is always understood as additional to, and detachable from, the object
form it takes or results in. This metaphysic is the familiar spirit/matter
divide of a ‘transcendentalist’ (Strathern 2018), hierarchical cosmology.

In the context of an earlier (and different) debate22, Carol Delaney
(1986) has pointed out that transcendentalist conceptions of creativity
(and creation) are aspects of a Judeo-Christian monotheistic heritage,
linking this to the gender implications of the modernist version of
creation. She points out that Adam was the genitor of the line of
human beings who, partaking in God’s divine creativity, were able to
recreate themselves. They knew themselves as God’s people because of
this ability to project themselves into the world through their progeny.
Culture, agriculture, objectification, all those elements in our history
and society that impose form upon the world are versions of the
primordial creativity that Adam embodied, of man planting his seed
in the receptive earth, and knowing himself through his own reflection
in the response. Delaney argues that it is this idea of ‘paternity’ that is
a core symbol around which analysis is organised. It also has a strong
influence on ownership, since it was God’s earth (he created it) that
was given to Adam, who then passed it down the male line to his
descendants. Paternity in this construction is an act of adding life or
spirit to inert but receptive matter. She locates this as a Judeo-Christian
political legacy, a hierarchical, ‘transcendentalist’ cosmology where life
is outside and inscribed in matter. We have the notion of the ‘soul’ as
a result: that which lives beyond and outside the material body. As
Starthern points out, the anthropological notion of animism was a
retrospective projection of this notion of ‘soul’ into primitive cultures.33
Instead, Strathern also invites us to conceptualise life in and through
materials, and this brings me to some recent writing about Melanesia
in which assumptions about life (and death) are turned around in an
illuminating manner.
In her Foerster Lecture (2018), Strathern considers ‘life in materials’
in a specific formulation: the capacity of some (staple food) crops in
Melanesia to self-replicate asexually. That is, both taro and yam are
replanted each year from parts of the self-same corm/tuber that is also
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eaten. Reproduction is a form of ‘cloning’ (11), where the same plant
is grown or regrown year after year. Referring now to ethnographic
material I will draw upon later in this paper (on harvesting yams in
Reite village on the Rai Coast of Madang, in Papua New Guinea), a
short portion of the top of the tuber is retained while the rest is cooked
and eaten. This ‘head’ is replanted in the subsequent year’s garden and
regrows. The plant is the same, and life is thus continuous over many
generations; ‘it is the bit of the corm or tuber that is cut off or otherwise
separated from what is to be eaten that provides the nourishment for
the new corm or tuber that grows in its stead. What is eventually
harvested is in effect a ‘replacement’ for the piece that was planted,
frequently imagined as a parent, whether father or mother, who dries
up, shrivels and dies away’ (Strathern 2018: 12). In pointing this out,
Strathern helps us make sense of many of the things that gardeners in
Melanesia say and do with their crops in a manner that does not replicate
a hierarchical cosmology of the animation of matter by spirit or idea.
Reite people insist, for example, that taro was and is a deity, and
the taro deity gave Reite people the knowledge and processes of taro
cultivation alongside the original strain of taro. The deity ‘disappeared’
after instructing Reite ancestors in how to grow (himself) but said he
would always be with them when they followed his process and planted
the original taro strain as the centerpiece of their gardens. Taro also
self-regenerates, producing seed corms from the sides of the taro corm
which is eaten, and these are replanted in the name and breath/voice/
tune of the taro deity each year. The deity regrows. He does not enter
into the plant. He is the plant.44

It is not just plants that are regrown. People take the names of their
grandfather’s generation in Reite. They follow their ancestors’ words and
their actions in relating to taro. As Strathern writes, ‘the identification
of the present planter with his or her predecessor, the one whom he or
she has ‘replaced’, is repeated over and again (Strathern 2018: 12). By
linking cloning and immortality, Starthern redirects our attention as
to where life may be continued without recourse to a transcendental
soul or spirit, and how life (and death) are ‘immanent’ in the very
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processes of material transformations. This provocatively suggests that if
anything is immortal, it is the body that replicates over generations. Far
from ‘the soul’ transcending the body after death, if the soul is located
anywhere, it is in the plants that, as themselves, appear and reappear
in each generation. She outlines the possibility of conceptualising a
‘Melanesian immanentism’ (2018: 17). Strathern herself contrasts this
‘immanentist’ cosmology with a ‘transcendentalist’ (2018: 12-13) of
which Delaney’s description could stand.55 As Strathern writes ‘We
simply do not need to concern ourselves with the relation between body
and soul in terms of materiality and spirituality…’ (17).

With this framework, and taking two core ideas – that of the
possibility of understanding materials as themselves having and
participating in life, and of the kind of temporality implied by
agricultural and kinship systems in which regeneration through
cloning are cyclical processes of immanence, I wish to turn to the
‘matter’ of my investigation: knowledge and documents in this particular
area of Papua New Guinea: the Rai Coast, and specifically in Reite
village. I will explore what we might learn about knowledge and its
appearance through examining documents as a form of knowing that
is itself knowledge and does not inscribe knowledge that is somehow
located elsewhere, outside the process. The question is that of how
we can describe knowledge as immanent in the doing, rather than
a transcendent something waiting to be inscribed in material form.
To signpost the connection to law, in what follows, I refer to
documents relating to ‘kastom’ on the Rai Coast. They take us far
from the way in which law presents itself as common sense in a
‘transcendentalist’ formulation. If the legal materialist notion of law
holds an implicit idea of knowledge in distinction to materiality, the
manner in which Reite people are doing documents suggest a different
way of defining (or ‘doing’) law, and one which offers an approach to
understanding how ‘law’ is constituted that includes materials not as
prop or manifestation, but as the thing itself.
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3 Colonial documents
Reite people live in a tropical rainforest environment. They subsist
by yam and taro cultivation, and hunting and collecting of game and
other forest resources. They are part of a language group of around
1200 speakers called Nekgini. Colonised by the Germans around
the turn of the 20 th century, and subsequently administered by
Australia, but a long way outside the practical, everyday orbit of any
administrator, a Lutheran mission station was opened on the nearby
coast in the early 1900s, and labour migration for plantation work and
mining was sporadically imposed or encouraged during the first half
of the last century (Lawrence 1964: 42-3). First missionised by native
mission workers in 1936, Nekgini speakers initially adopted the new
religion of the colonising power before subsequently rejecting it and
self-consciously re-adopting what became called ‘kastom’, that is, ritual
and religious activities that they identified as linked to taro and yam,
and practicing a musical male cult that requires initiation and long
periods of abstinence and restriction. By the 1970’s Australian colonial
efforts to ‘develop’ such rural areas through agricultural outreach
schemes resulted in sporadic cash cropping (coffee and cocoa) and after
Independence (1975), the arrival of a primary school (1990s), a medical
aid post, and other crops. More recently, logging and the construction
of a large nickel processing plant along the coast has had a significant
impact on their environment and made them peripherally (and wholly
unsatisfactorily) engaged in sporadically servicing a market economy
(Leach 2014). Reite were not unique in rejecting missionisation. The
Rai Coast and parts of Madang province were the site of some of the
most famous re-interpretations and creative engagements with colonial
rule that go under the name of ‘Cargo Cult’ in the Pacific. The foremost
mid-century anthropological account of these ‘phenomena’ is that
of Peter Lawrence.66 As Lawrence shows, dissatisfaction with their
inferior position under colonial rule and under expanding capitalism
spurred a number of attempts to rebalance the situation through ritual
and religious means, at times drawing directly on Christianity, at times
creating hybrid practices that utilised old beliefs and merged them with
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interpretations of the new religion (and what the whites were hiding
of that religion) or sometimes, as in Reite, re-invigorating ancestral
practice itself. In the case of Reite, some did this in the hope of bringing
cargo. Writing and documents have played a significant role in this
history of responding to colonialism and ‘law’.

Colonial control was visible in and made apparent by the
introduction of religious texts (the Bible) and administrative forms and
orders. These two were inevitably bound together in local perception, as,
‘Historically, literacy [….], like virtually everywhere else in the Pacific
region, was introduced in Christian contexts’ (Kulick and Stroud 1990:
290). As Lawrence recounts, ‘After 1904, each village or hamlet cluster
was placed under a native headman or luluai … who had to maintain
order, guard the village census book, report epidemics and settle minor
disputes’ (1964: 42-3). The census book, the written order, the bible
knowledge and admonition of the catechist, were the material forms in
which colonial power (law) appeared. Lawrence tells us that on the Rai
Coast, ‘the natives decided to become Christian partly from political
motives’ (74), and this was bound to the use of documents. Villagers
could not accept that the new way of life represented by the material
trappings of colonial power did not go alongside the new religion that
‘would explain and validate it in the same way’ (74). ‘Christianity by
explaining and validating the new way of life would automatically
explain and grant control over its essential ingredient, the cargo’ (74).
Where, ‘the keynotes of the traditional religion were its materialism
and its anthropocentrism’ (75), it is unsurprising that reading and
writing, and documents themselves, were considered the technology
through which power was exercised. ‘As English was one of the subjects
taught, the [introduction of schooling] aroused considerable interest
and enthusiasm. Many people … believed that at least they would be
able to read the European’s Bible in toto and discover the cargo secrets
for themselves’ (Lawrence 1964: 98). Note that Christianity was linked
through literacy and documents to colonial power, not as a transcendent
spirit (God) but as a practical method of achieving power.
The emphasis on written laws and written knowledge is important.
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On the Rai Coast an overstretched administration attempted to make
alliances with local leaders after world war two in order to bring control.
This was the period of the famous ‘cult’ leader Yali, who for long
periods had administrative backing. Lawrence reports that Yali was
deeply concerned about his standing in the eyes of the administration,
and was highly competitive with the missions for authority. Believing
himself to have been given permission, even encouragement, to revive
and practice ancestral forms of religion (kastom) set him on a collision
course with the Missions who were the de facto educators and bringers
of colonial change into Rai Coast people’s lives.
Lawrence describes a growing ‘bureaucracy’ around Yali on the Rai
Coast. He was illiterate, but many of his followers, ‘styled themselves
as his secretaries, dealing with his correspondence, compiling lists of
workers, and writing down his instructions’ (145). Lawrence goes on
to note rather disparagingly in a footnote that, ‘the documents show
no appreciation of the meaning of letter-writing and the material they
contained could have been better handled verbally. They served more
than anything else to enhance the writers’ importance’ (145 f2).

On the Rai Coast, ‘Yali was encouraged to draw up a set of “laws”,
combining the best features of the two cultures, for native society.
[He] .. spent a great deal of time drafting several documents in Pidgin
English. One document listed influential supporters…. Another the
procedures for ordering goods from the stores… setting out old and new
“laws” … organisation of work in the village, house-building, marriage
rules,… water rights, reef rights, land rights, funeral ceremonies…; the
use of sorcery and love magic [etc.]’ (Lawrence 1964: 172). Lawrence
tells us that ‘The Yali laws were never… tested by the Crown Law
Office for their strict legality. This was probably quite unnecessary,
for they do not appear to have contravened the Administration’s legal
codes in any way. … But, according to Yali, the Administrator told
him personally … that he fully approved of the “Laws”… After these
remarks, Yali believed that his victory over the missions was complete: he
need brook no further interference from them’ (Lawrence 1964: 75,
emphasis added). Victory (power) was gained by the activity of making
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and circulating documents.

Roger Keesing reports that Kwaio people from Malatia in the
neighbouring Solomon Islands also reacted to colonial rule through
producing documents (written laws and codes) of their own. In the
‘struggle for cultural autonomy’ (Keesing 1992), Kwaio speaking people,
as Kulick and Stroud put it, ‘actively and creatively apply literate skills
to suit their own purposes and needs’ (1990: 287). In the Kwaio case
this meant the formulation and material manifestation of their own laws
and customs to actively prove to their colonial masters that they were
capable and deserving of self-governance. This was, unsurprisingly, to
be achieved through documenting these laws. ‘The legitimacy of British
claims to sovereignty was symbolically established with flags and
parades and distant King and bewigged magistrates as well as warships
and Winchester rifles. The semiology of domination – and the place
of the written word in its imposition – casts important light on Kwaio
resistance. Contestation operates at a symbolic as well as a political
level’ (Keesing 1992: 232). In other words, the law and resistance to
the imposition was made present and had its effects through the act
of writing and circulating documents. Part of my argument is that
Rai Coast people saw literacy, writing, and documentation as actions.
Documents and writing were the way of acting and doing ‘law’ and
‘knowledge’ appropriate to the new form of power. To reiterate above,
‘law’ was writing and circulating documents. The actual content (as
Kulick and Stroud emphasize) was not the issue (1992: 289). Words
could be misleading, it was clear the Bible was not complete (as it had
no mention of how to achieve equality with and the material wealth
of the whites), etc. It was in the doing of documents that power might
be gained.
By no means all of those who adhere to or value ‘traditional
knowledge’ or kastom on the contemporary Rai Coast do so in the
hope it will make ‘cargo’ appear. Nevertheless, there is to this day a
consistent desire for recognition, equality, and access to power expressed
by Reite people and Rai Coast dwellers more widely. With a history
of competitive and often agonistic internal and external relations, but
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with no inherited authority or wealth, the structural inequalities and
consolidation of power within the colonial and now post-colonial state,
as well as the inequalities natural to capitalist economies, have always
been considered as perverse or worse.

So documents were known on the Rai Coast in processes and
flows of both internal and external relations (census, voting papers,
colonial bureaucracy, laws, bible), and local versions of control have
been asserted at times through paper and ink and their use. There is
recognition of a kind of force and legal status, although that ‘legal’
is linked often to the church and the bible and associated with the
promise of damnation or salvation. But the damnation/salvation binary
was immediately interpreted in immanentist, not in transcendentalist,
terms – that the damnation or salvation that was talked about was
the current and practical inequality between whites and Rai Coast
people. That salvation would be ‘cargo’ as the material of recognition
and power. The circulation of paper was central to the project of
achieving this ‘salvation’. Paper was employed in direct mimicry of
western bureaucracy, and as the medium in which to convey claims
to the colonial and independent state. We cannot possibly read their
enthusiasm for an anthropologist writing about their kastom and history
in any other context than this perception of the power of paper and
documents in engaging with new manifestations of the power of life and
death that they always claim was and is theirs. That is, in immanentist
rather than transcendentalist terms. What then, we might ask, does
documenting kastom, as traditional or ancestral ‘knowledge’ or law look
like if it is an action in itself, rather than the inscription of a corpus
of knowledge and practice that transcends its material manifestation?
4 Documenting ‘knowledge’
In 2014 I began a collaborative project (TKRN) with people in
Reite village, and with an artist/designer colleague Giles Lane77, to
develop a documentation system that we, and other rural people, could
use to record and transmit what we termed Traditional Knowledge
(as a well acknowledged, inadequate shorthand). The impetus was
very much from the side of Reite villagers. This is important. From
26
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my first arrival as an anthropology student 25 years ago, Reite people
have supported and encouraged the writing down of their ‘kastom’ for
variations on the reasons set out above. They say they were ‘waiting’ for
it to happen. The 2014 project grew from the desire of particular people
to make records ‘to link them with future generations’ (Nombo and
Leach 2010), and to find a way that this could be achieved using simple,
locally available materials, and also in a manner that took account (to
the extent possible), of a relational, personal and processual form that
knowledge and knowledge exchanges take in the area (Leach 2012,
Leach forthcoming).

We began by drawing on Giles’s work developing a system for
‘public authoring’. Porer Nombo and Pinbin Sisau met Giles and began
exploring his publishing system during a visit to the British Museum
in 2009 (Nombo and Sisau, 2015). ‘Public Authoring’ is based on a
paper folding technique that allows commonly used paper formats to
be hand modified into self-binding booklets. These booklets require
simple tools, and yet are designed to become hybrid entities existing
both physically and digitally. PDF templates are created that are
the basis for the booklets. When printed out, the sheets are cut and
folded. The templates can be designed with different rubrics, questions,
information etc. They are then available to people to fill in any way they
see fit (within the constraints of the format (i.e., number of pages, two
dimensions, written or drawn records, etc.). More or less guidance or
direction is possible when designing specific templates. Once complete,
the booklets can be unfolded and scanned, offering a potentially more
durable digital copy of the original. Digital files can be printed and
re-folded to provide a facsimile. The scans can be stored, combined
with others to generate a series or set, and shared through digital media
formats if so desired. Giles and his booklets offered a way to experiment,
and we began what we thought of as an extended ‘co-design’ process of
templates and a process/protocols for their use. This involved intense
discussions of what templates for specific booklets that would be useful
to villagers would look like, and with many public meetings in Reite
villages gauging interest, concerns, opposition, and receiving advice.
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The fact that people independently decided on the topic and scope
of their documents made for some interesting outcomes and discussions.
For example, many people recorded the ‘same’ things. Taro and yam
figure prominently, with levels of detail from complex and intricate to
very minimal, and differently phrased accounts of taro and its origins,
gardening techniques, and so forth. Reite people did not show any
concern over repetition, or duplication, and from Giles and my
perspective, we realised that individual records actually allow for a
diversity to appear within any one topic, and for different aspects to
be recorded. Although unplanned, it also mitigates the emergence of
overly canonical or authoritative versions that come under the control
of one generation or group, and reflects the multiple connections and
types of relationship that constitute ‘knowledge’. Each booklet then is
one actualisation that in fact is only part of an actualisation anyway.
Writing things down does amount to a kind of fixing, but it does not
guarantee that any reader is necessarily going to practice it in the same
way.88
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Some absolutely beautiful documents have been produced. Many are
detailed, careful, and superbly artistic. The spontaneous introduction of
drawing into many of the booklets is significant. Of course, artistry is
a key aspect of any process involving knowledge, as aesthetic effect is
crucial to the demonstration of power in Reite initiation, ceremony and
exchange. ‘Knowledge’ is a relation to or manifestation of a particular
kind of power here, and much of that power is the effect one can have
on the reactions or actions of others (including, of course, taro or yam).99

Most, if not all, however careful, are incomplete in some way.
Booklets are more often than not indicative of a story or process than
a complete rendering of it. Even those who are most vocal advocates
of the booklet project have not used it to make a comprehensive record
of knowledge that is in ‘danger’ of being ‘lost’. Most records are of
things that are quite well ‘known’. There has been no systematic effort
to use them with frail old people, nor seemingly to prioritise rare or
esoteric knowledge. Perhaps this reflects the fact that there is no sense
of an existential need to document knowledge as such. The desire for
documentation does not come from the same aesthetic of knowledge
as that of a transcendentalist tradition.
29
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Reite people deliberately leave things out. One line of interpretation
is that showing that there is knowledge is an invitation to a further
relationship. In fact, many things that are in referred to in the booklets
require a specific relationship to the documenter to be effective. Taboos
have to be followed, and obligations to particular persons who revealed
the ‘knowledge’ are necessary to ‘knowing’ it – that is, for it to ‘work’.
Documenting is an invitation to a relationship, where people are not
working with a conception of knowledge that requires a comprehensive
record. And this points to the core of my argument – the booklets
are doing other things. In fact, the booklets are a ‘doing’. They are a
performance of knowing, a process in which knowledge is shown to be
a resource for connection and future/past relations to coalesce.
As Crook has argued, the ‘modern’ impulse to document knowledge
arises in a form of temporality in which there are objects or units of
information that disappear if not transmitted or recorded (2007: 1011). We fear the loss of knowledge because the past recedes, and we
and cannot go back and retrieve something that is gone. Perspectival
forward movement in time spurs documentation to prevent things
receding into the past. But in a cyclical and regenerative cosmology
where yams are regrown, and taro the same taro, and you are your
grandfather and your grandchildren imply no possibility for loss in this
sense. Here ‘knowledge’ is operating in a different manner. Performance
and enactment is key. Questions about the form and content of TKRN
documents that concerned Reite people have been more about an
aesthetic of effectiveness in these terms than about completeness
or coverage per se. And even more interestingly, incompleteness
was completely deliberate in many cases, and explicitly motivated.
Documentation is of a capacity for having an effect, not of a series of
knowledge-objects that lined up together could be called ‘encyclopedic’
or ‘comprehensive’. Documents are a doing of knowledge that connect
children and grandchildren in relations of power. As the willingness
to engage in documenting shows, this is not an argument that there
is no novelty, but that new and old alike are immanent in relations.
Reite people have already adapted the form of attribution that we
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carefully thought out. In a perhaps brilliant move, they have innovated
spectacularly on the mode for keeping things attached to persons.
Many of the booklets now name the children or grandchildren of the
actual writer as the author. They substitute pictures of these children
for the picture of the writer, and use that child’s name on the cover in
the consent and circulation rubric. Just as it does not seem necessary to
these documenters to agree a canonical form for kastom in the process
of documenting it (but there are heated and constant debates in other
arenas about correct ancestral procedure), nor to ensure complete
coverage or preservation, a concern with ‘authorship’ as such is not the
point. Having multiple versions of the same story demonstrates a desire
not to divide labour and document everything, but to claim a connection
with certain important things. And the subversion of generations is
also part of this. Placing the child on the cover is like putting that
knowledge into the future. ‘Loss’ is directly obviated as the transfer is
already made. ‘Loss’ effectively disappears. As an anthropologist from
a tradition of transcendental images of knowledge, I was concerned
about if the booklet survives or not, how village people can access it,
and so forth. These were not their concerns. Instead, some writers in
Reite have taken the document as a possibility for the future to be
made to happen now. Knowledge is already the relation between the
parent and child, and that relation is made present in the material
that is the booklet. To further understand this, I wish to return here
to the division between spirit and matter that Ingold identifies in his
critique, and to Strathern on mortality and immortality in Melanesian
systems of thought.

I suggest we think about secrecy and revelation as material practices.
Not the material manifestation (inscription) of an abstract ‘knowledge’
that somehow lies elsewhere, but the very thing itself. Talk is a material
practice, with breath and flesh shaping sound and travelling though
the medium of the air, effected by the acoustic properties of the spaces
and structures in which it happens. The process of transmission then
is the material; it is not something that happens to the ideational that
lies somehow elsewhere or outside the transmission. And much of the
transmission of ‘knowledge’ in Reite is in hiding, staging, diverting
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attention, and in distributing responsibility and separating people
(Leach 2003: 79-87). Knowledge is not ‘there to be revealed’, but
is the revelation or the dissemination, is the meeting of initiate and
initiator. In other words, I think we need to try to think of knowledge
in ‘immanentist’ rather than ‘transcendentalist’ terms, and that means
not separating idea and form.
Where the past is present in the future, where you are your
grandfather and your child is the father of yourself, a different context
for knowledge and loss is implied. The yam you plant can be the same
yam that your father or grandfather planted. The name you call when
connecting your action in planting that yam is the same name as
these people used and the same your descendants will use. Looking
at Reite material, it is all too easy to fall back into familiar patterns of
understanding matter and spirit. That is, to see the garden magician
calling on the spirits to come and animate or grow his crops. But Reite
people insist that the yam and the man are the same. That planting and
calling are not different processes; they are the way you bring yams
into life and how the garden is grown. Knowledge is not separate from
the practice, not an addition, just as the life of the yam is not added or
additional to its substance and matter. Planting yam is a doing, a doing
of knowing that wraps the doer into a history and a future replete with
other people who are related through the action of planting.
Much, if not all, practice in Reite is with and about plants, insects,
animals, other bodies and people, and is directed to the processes of
growth and decay, life and death. Plants and animals and the form
of human bodies are known to be grown in particular contexts, that
is, the particular practices and stories, the histories of specific places.
The responsibility people take for the growth of tubers, or for the
appearance of game in the bush, or the transformation of a child into
an adult body, makes all these things ‘artefacts’; artefacts of effort, care
and attention, but not of molding, of the imposition of form that is
preconceived. They are processes that can be influenced and shaped but
not controlled or determined. This is the background and context to
the making of booklets that record or ‘are’ (part realization of) kastom
for future generations.
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5 The base of taro
I would like to dwell for a moment on a particular booklet,
representative in its way. Musir Hungeme produced a short booklet
called the ‘Foundation/Base of Taro’. In this booklet, Musir talks of
seemingly unrelated things. There is a stream (Holiting) in his lands.
He was cautioned strongly by his father that he must not eat the fresh
water snails that live in this stream as it is the foundation or base of
taro. Eating the snails will result in blocked ears, in inability to hear
what other people are saying, in ear infections with milky pus, and
eventually in deafness.
That is the extent of the content of the booklet. It amounts to a
rendition of a series of linkages between people and place, people
and water, particular streams, and the animals that reside there, how
they are treated, and the further (hugely significant) ‘taro’, both the
subsistence staple, and the deity that is the basis of the male cult. In
this one short booklet (only 100 words in all), links and connections,
consequences and responsibilities, knowledge and practice are all
materials that are connected in Musir and his father, and his children.
To an outsider they seem extraordinary – ranging wildly across scales
and modes of understanding and effect.

Can we use this document to ref lect on legal materials or
matters? There is clearly ‘law’ here. Clearly the booklet has effect and
consequence, the paper and the process now enrolled in a cosmic play
of positioning persons and power over fundamental materials and
processes. The ‘doing’ is a drawing together of connection and its
particular revelation. It is the snails and the water, where the water
flows to, and how that connects landscapes of myth, knowing and
practice, and how people’s practice and action is a part of these series
of connections such that effects are within particular bodies.
Reite people behave and interpret events as if the dead were very
much among them. They have a phrase about the continual presence
of the dead and spirits: ‘we had the ashes of the fire thrown in our eyes
and we cannot see’. Many myths relate a transformative moment in
which a living person arrives in a mirror world where his father and
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mother and grandparents live normal lives, growing gardens, organising
ceremonies and exchanges. Yet the things they grow are the inverse of
what people grow, and the things they prepare for ceremonies consist
of faeces and rubbish. The ‘living’ visitor is always cautioned against
being seen, and particularly against eating the food of their unwitting
hosts. To do so would be to join them and never return.

In a core myth of the Ripia kingroup (to whom Musir Hungeme
is closely related), such a visit to the underworld of the dead was made
possible by the mother of the man, who hid him under bark cloth
shields until everyone was busy with ceremony, and then he was able
to slip away back to the upper ground. He remembered the tune of the
spirits at the ceremony, and Ripia have since this time had the power to
curse taro gardens using this tune and name, to turn them to rubbish.
The place associated with the entrance to this underworld is a pool
in the Holiting stream on Ripia land, and the water from this pool
combined with the name of the spirit is so dangerous to taro gardens
that no one washes or draws water from there. It is downstream from
‘the foundation of taro’.

Reite people understand the dead to be present, not lost or gone
into the past. They reappear in generations to come. Writing in an
immanentist vein, Ingold says that things, ‘are in life rather than life
is in things’ (2007: 12). This offers us a way of comprehending the way
Reite people behave on the death of kinsmen, who are not gone, who
are present in their power or potential to bring sickness or to assist
with growth of tubers, who can show the hunter where game is to be
found in dreams. Life was not ‘in’ them and gone, yet they are no
longer ‘in life’. They have departed to the hidden world from which by
definition humans are excluded. But each can and will become the
other. Life (and death for Strathern) are immanent in cosmologies such
as Reite. This gives us a counterpart in thought and understanding; a
conception of knowledge here as action, effect, and relationship.
Knowledge is not a transcendent realm of ideas and stories, magical
formula and material practices; knowledge is immanent in the very
processes of relating to particular people and places. The format is not
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where knowledge is contained, but is itself a practice of knowledge as
the making of relations. Ingold explicitly acknowledges Bergson (and
Whitehead, 2011: 13-14) and follows a positive interpretation of
‘vitalism’ as immanent unfolding (see also Deleuze and Guattari 2004).

Musir’s booklet then is not making material an idea, it is not a
material form for an idea or a knowledge that is elsewhere, it is the
idea and the knowledge as a material practice that is not the same as
the material practice of collecting snails for making calcinated lime,
or planting taro. Those practices are here caught up by the booklets
in other processes that Reite people desire or adapt to – processes
that include anthropologists, missionaries, colonial and post-colonial
administrations and new contexts for relations with their past and
future, ‘they partake in the very processes of the world’s ongoing
generation and regeneration, of which things such as manuscripts or
house fronts are impermanent by-products’ (Ingold 2007: 9, emphasis
added). There is also reason in this for Reite people’s lack of concern
with the material manifestation of their knowledge as property (they
choose to manage its revelation and concealment, not restrict the
circulation of the booklets) that is instructive and interesting. Property
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(and intellectual property) are part of a cosmology in which objects and
material are separate from their ideation, and knowledge exists outside
its manifestation or inscription. That separation makes the materials
secondary. Inscription makes knowledge appear as if it were the material
of its manifestation. Things are seen to matter in law precisely because
knowledge is seen to lie ‘in’ them. Of course this is also a way of ‘doing’
knowledge, one in which the dualism of the state/subject, or the society/
individual, or culture/material is precisely remade as ‘real’.
6 Conclusion
The combination of the Christian deity of transcendental power and of
law as a power of control, were there, made present, through Bibles and
censuses. Colonial officials considered they represented the state (as
a transcendent authority), the missions that they represented God (a
transcendent power), but Rai Coast people saw books and documents
used and circulating. The process of colonialism for them was the
appearance of materials in which ‘the law’ was made present. In fact,
they were the law – certainly they were how it had its effects.1010 Rai
Coast people interpreted the material practice of colonial power as
the technology that would bring the ‘development’ or the salvation of
the state/church. The outcome of using them should be control over
material goods– the material manifestation of the power of the relation
to the state/deity. Today they are interested in doing documents as the
way in which power and salvation are done by white people. Yet the
practices of knowledge – how it comes into being and what it ‘is’ – are
rather different.
Ingold’s critique highlighted certain assumptions behind the turn
to ‘materiality’ in anthropology, suggesting it assumes objects and
materials are animated by social agency or spirit. This speaks of a
‘transcendental’ bias to the approach. The ‘legal materialities’ approach
sets out a desire to understand law as a special or particular domain
of practice, and thus of its materialities as specific to law, having both
an immanentist understanding of law as a doing with materials, and a
transcendentalist understanding of the way law shapes material practice
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to make materials specifically ‘legal’. The frame is one in which a
positive analytic emerges from this contradiction. But there are pitfalls.
Materials could easily take a secondary role to what is inscribed or
brought into being through their use. In this, we would see a familiar
pattern of dualism where materials are inert vehicles for meaning
generated elsewhere (ie. in society or culture), of objects given agency
by human actors/society/the law. Viz: ‘Law’s specific materiality can
then be understood as a particular and concrete effect of interaction
between nonorganic and organic matters and social events in legal
language, which is expressed in abstract form and various formats’ (Hyo
Yoon Kang 2018: 464). In other words, there is a danger that we keep
running up against Law as a ‘reality’ that is inscribed in, makes use
of, and appears through materials. The problems for a legal materialist
approach that does not face up to this contradiction arise when the
state becomes blurred with the transcendental rationality that law
rhetorically relies upon, and with the notion of justice (as a rational,
transcendent reasoning). This re-inscribes a tendency to the idea that
law is outside practice or action, outside documents or materials, and
is ‘there to be’ inscribed.
Instead, I have asked, what if material actions (documentation)
were the doing of knowledge, and knowledge were immanent within
the relations they constitute, rather than outside them? What, in fact,
if material actions were the doing of law, and law is immanent in the
relations they constitute?
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1. On theories of ‘virgin birth’ in anthropological writings.
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2. The ‘soul’ in Tylor may be important here – that he was looking for an
evolutionary predecessor to the civilized notion of the soul in true religion
in primitive society and found ‘animism’ – the belief that rocks or plants
or trees or whatever are animated by spirit. A projection of what Higgin
terms a ‘western animism’.

3. There is work to do (elsewhere) on the question of gender made apparent
here. In simplest terms the distinction between God-Adam-Paternity and
Taro follows the argument above: whereas God animates matter, Taro is
the plant. To take this further Strathern’s earlier writing on gender in
Melanesia could be linked to the immanentist/transcendent scheme.
Her contrast is between gender as a given property of particular bodies
and Melanesian gender as immanent (emergent) in relations themselves.
4. And see Alan Strathern (2019).

5. He writes that, ‘New Guinea Cargo cult’, ‘is based on the native’s belief
that European goods (cargo) – ships, aircraft, trade articles, and military
equipment – are not man made but have to be obtained from a non human
or divine source. It expresses its follower’s dissatisfaction with their status
in colonial society…’ (Lawrence 1964: 1).
6. http://proboscis.org.uk/about/people/giles-lane/

7. I am aware that these points, while valid, are not the concerns Reite people
expressed but address concerns Giles and I had in thinking of what might
be consequences of recording ‘traditional knowledge’. There is more that
could be said about this contrast.

8. I hope the suggestive analogy to how we might think about law’s materials
is apparent.
9. Other than brute violence, of which there is nothing transcendent.
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